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Antidiscrimination Statutes and Women-Only
Spaces in the #MeToo Era
Anna Porter†

I. INTRODUCTION
In response to the #MeToo Movement, many organizations began
attempting to find creative ways to address the realities people who
identify as women face both at work and in public spaces.1 These organizations often focus on closing the gender pay gap and increasing representation in leadership, both indicators tied to sexual harassment in
the workplace.2 Although the organizations discussed below are open to
female-identifying and non-binary people, they exclude men.3 Organizations argue that providing women-only events “offer forums for discussing discrimination, a haven for people who may feel excluded by the
dominant culture of broader professional groups, and career advancement opportunities for demographics at a statistical disadvantage.”4
From co-working spaces to empowerment seminars to women-only
showings of Wonder Woman, the popularity of these spaces suggests
that women respond to the idea of having a space where they know they

†

B.A. 2011, Bellarmine University; M.A. 2015, University of Florida; J.D. Candidate 2020,
The University of Chicago Law School. Many thanks to Professor Aziz Huq for his guidance and
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1
Leigh Stringer, Where is the Demand for Women-Only Co-Working Spaces Coming From?,
SLATE (May 17, 2018), https://slate.com/human-interest/2018/05/the-wing-demand-for-women-onl
y-co-working-spaces-is-high.html [https://perma.cc/S8MZ-H63Q].
2
See Jennifer Calfas, Inside Sexual Harassment’s Hidden Toll on Equal Pay, TIME (April 9,
2018), http://time.com/5227742/sexual-harassment-equal-pay-wage-gap; Karen Higginbottom, The Link Between Power and Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, FORBES (June 11, 2018), https://w
ww.forbes.com/sites/karenhigginbottom/2018/06/11/the-link-between-power-and-sexual-harassm
ent-in-the-workplace/#487cd27b190f [https://perma.cc/8R9D-3HA8].
3 In discussing women-only spaces, this Comment is not referring to events held by TransExclusionary Radical Feminists.
4
Christina Cauterucci, Members of a Men’s Rights Group Sued a Women’s Networking Group
for Sex Discrimination, SLATE (Jan. 15, 2016), https://slate.com/human-interest/2016/01/membersof-a-men-s-rights-group-sued-a-women-s-networking-group-for-sex-discrimination.html [https://p
erma.cc/RZZ8-GXFU].
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will only be surrounded by other women.5 However, because these initiatives are by nature segregated by gender (excluding men), they risk
coming into contact with state antidiscrimination statutes.6 For this
reason, many of these organizations have recently come under fire by
men bringing charges of discrimination.7
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which addresses discrimination in public accommodations, does not include sex or gender as a protected category.8 Because there is no national standard with respect to
sex discrimination in public accommodations, plaintiffs rely on state
statutes in the majority of these cases.9 The amount of protection afforded by various states changes depending upon “legislative definitions and judicial interpretations of what constitutes a public accommodation.”10 California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act is one example of an
expansive antidiscrimination statute.11 Enacted by the California legislature in 1959 as an amendment to the Civil Code, the Unruh Civil
Rights Act prohibits California businesses from discriminating based
on protected characteristics.12 Sex was added as a protected characteristic through a 1974 amendment to the law.13
While the tension between sex-segregated spaces and laws prohibiting discrimination is not new, in the past the vast majority of these
lawsuits targeted men-only organizations (and laws prohibiting it envisioned men-only organizations discriminating against women).14 Today,
male plaintiffs in California suing women’s organizations for sex discrimination argue that these cases should not be treated any differently
than other cases of discrimination brought under the Unruh Act.15 The
5

Stringer, supra note 1.
Rebecca Gale, When Men Sue Women’s Empowerment Orgs for Gender Discrimination, SLATE (July 3, 2018), https://slate.com/human-interest/2018/07/men-are-suing-womens-empowerment
-organizations-for-gender-discrimination.html [https://perma.cc/EGB8-W7VA].
7
Id.
8
42 U.S.C. § 2000a.
9
Jessica E. Rank, Is Ladies’ Night Really Sex Discrimination?: Public Accommodation Laws,
De Minimis Exceptions, and Stigmatic Injury, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 223, 225 (2005). This Comment refers to sex discrimination, rather than gender discrimination, in keeping with the way
legislatures and the courts use the term. The statute at issue in California clarifies that “sex”
includes gender identity and gender expression. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51(e)(5).
10
Marissa L. Goodman, A Scout is Morally Straight, Brave, Clean, Trustworthy . . . and Heterosexual? Gays in the Boy Scouts of America, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 825, 830 (1999).
11
Cal. Civ. Code § 51.
12
Id.
13
Jean Douglas Murphy, Women’s Rights Legislation—A Vintage Year, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 3,
1974, at H1.
14
Deborah Rhode, Association and Assimilation, 81 NW. U.L. REV. 106, 114 (1986).
15
Complaint at 3, Rich Allison v. Red Door Epicurean, LLC, No. 2017-00036282, Cal. Super.
Ct. (2017) (“For a business operating in the progressive state of California, in the year 2017, to
provide accommodations, advantages, privileges, or services to only female patrons, is as repugnant and unlawful as businesses being involved in a “Caucasian Night” or a “Heterosexual Night”
6
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extent to which a California court would agree is as yet unclear, as organizations to this point have settled these cases rather than face expensive legal defense fees.16
This Comment will analyze the application of California’s Unruh
Civil Rights Act to women-only organizations and events in the #MeToo
Era. California provides an especially interesting case study because of
the wide protections against discrimination under its civil rights law.
In part because discrimination under the law is per se injurious, there
is a plethora of available cases to review.17 Further, in the past few
years, several California men have brought lawsuits against women’s
empowerment organizations for hosting women-only events. Given the
current appeal of these types of organizations, as well as the media attention on #MeToo, it is an interesting time to engage in a discussion
about the scope of state antidiscrimination statutes and the ways courts
might or should apply the law to these new organizations. As California
has such broad protections, outlining more clearly the scope of the law
and providing strategies for ways to defend against allegations is important for organizations seeking to promote women’s empowerment.
Further, as the statute’s protections are broad, it can serve as an example for other state legislatures and courts.
Part II of this Comment will track the jurisprudence surrounding
the Unruh Act in order to highlight how California courts have interpreted the law in cases of sex discrimination claims to this point. Part
III will look to the purpose of the Unruh Act to analyze whether the
California legislature contemplated these types of suits under the law.
The law has primarily expanded to protect different identified marginalized groups. The fact that it might be wielded by more privileged
groups against organizations seeking to promote gender equality highlights potential inconsistencies with the Unruh Act and its application.
Part IV will argue that courts in California should follow Supreme
Court jurisprudence in Fourteenth Amendment cases, limiting application to discrimination that perpetuates irrational stereotypes. Finally,
Part V will suggest a legislative alternative to judicial action, carving
out an exception to the Unruh Act for remedial actions taken by historically marginalized groups.

and denying admission and discounted drinks and other accommodations, advantages, privileges,
or services to patrons of color or to gay or lesbian patrons, respectively.”).
16
Rebecca Gale, When Men Sue Women’s Empowerment Orgs for Gender Discrimination, SLATE (July 3, 2018), https://slate.com/human-interest/2018/07/men-are-suing-womens-empowerment
-organizations-for-gender-discrimination.html [https://perma.cc/EGB8-W7VA].
17
Koire v. Metro Car Wash, 40 Cal. 3d 24, 33 (1985) (“[B]y passing the Unruh Act, the Legislature established that arbitrary sex discrimination by businesses is per se injurious.”)
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II. JURISPRUDENCE SURROUNDING THE UNRUH CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
This section will first consider California courts’ interpretation of
the Unruh Act and the way that interpretation has been used in the
past to combat discrimination against women in places of public accommodation. Most of the early cases of sex discrimination in California
involve women seeking access to men-only spaces. This section will
show how the courts in California expanded the definition of “business
establishments” to include things like a nonprofit Boys’ Club18 and the
Rotary Club,19 but not the Boy Scouts of America20 or a local private
high school.21 This sometimes-fine line the courts have drawn makes it
potentially difficult for defendants to know when they might be subject
to provinces of the Unruh Act. The section then turns to cases brought
over the past decades by men against businesses offering promotions to
women, largely in the form of “Ladies’ Night” discounts. Finally, it considers recent examples of men suing organizations that host women’s
empowerment events.
A.

California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act and “Business Establishments”

Enacted in 1959, the Unruh Civil Rights Act provides broad protections against discrimination. As most recently amended in 2015, the
Unruh Act currently provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and
equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sexual orientation, citizenship, primary
language, or immigration status are entitled to the full and
equal accommodations, advantages, privileges, or services in all
business establishments of every kind whatsoever.22
The Unruh Act provides a private cause of action and either a maximum
of three times the actual damages or statutory damages of at least
18

Ibister v. Boys’ Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., 707 P.2d 212 (Cal. 1985).
Rotary Club of Duarte v. Bd. Of Dirs., 178 Cal. App. 3d 1035, aff’d Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary
Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
20
Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts, 952 P.2d 218, 237 (Cal. 1998).
21
Doe v. California Lutheran High Sch. Assn., 170 Cal. App. 4th 828, 838 (2009).
22
CAL. CIV. CODE § 51(b); The Act further clarifies that “‘Sex’ includes, but is not limited to,
pregnancy, childbirth, or medical conditions related to pregnancy or childbirth. ‘Sex’ also includes,
but is not limited to, a person’s gender. ‘Gender’ means sex, and includes a person’s gender identity
and gender expression. ‘Gender expression’ means a person’s gender-related appearance and behavior whether or not stereotypically associated with the person’s assigned sex at birth.” CAL. CIV.
CODE § 51(e)(5).
19
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$4,000 for each violation.23 It further allows a court to award attorney’s
fees to prevailing plaintiffs.24
To avoid First Amendment concerns related to the freedom of private association, state statutes follow the Supreme Court in providing
exceptions for private clubs.25 They prohibit discrimination only in
places of public accommodation, which is defined slightly differently
from state to state.26 The Supreme Court has noted that the First
Amendment “afford[s] constitutional protection to freedom of association in two distinct senses.”27 First, the Court has held that individuals
are protected in their intimate or private relationships.28 In order to
determine whether a given relationship qualifies for this type of protection, the Court looks to “factors such as size, purpose, selectivity, and
whether others are excluded from critical aspects of the relationship.”29
Second, the Court has defined the rights of individuals to expressive
association, “to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.”30 In
attempting to square First Amendment freedom of association concerns
with state public accommodation statutes prohibiting discrimination,
the Supreme Court uses a balancing test that weighs “the infringement
upon a group’s right to freedom of expressive association against the
state’s compelling interest in eradicating and preventing discrimination.”31
The Unruh Act prohibits discrimination “in all business establishments of any kind whatsoever.”32 In interpreting this language, California courts have recognized a legislative “intent to use the term ‘business
establishments’ in the broadest sense reasonably possible.”33 In keeping
with First Amendment freedom of association rights, the California Supreme Court has concluded that the provisions of the Unruh Act “do not
apply to the membership decisions of a truly private social club.”34
Although “truly private” clubs are not subject to the Unruh Act,
merely stating that a club is private does not preclude enforcement of

23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

Id. at § 52(a).
Id.
Goodman, supra note 10.
Id.
Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 544 (1987).
Id.
Id. at 546, citing Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
Id. at 549.
Goodman, supra note 10.
CAL. CIV. CODE §51(b).
Warfield v. Peninsula Golf & Country Club, 896 P.2d 776, 786 (1995).
Id. at 791.
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the Unruh Act against it.35 The California Supreme Court faced the issue of the application of the Unruh Act to “private” clubs when a woman
sued a nonprofit private country club in Warfield v. Peninsula Golf &
Country Club.36 There, the court discussed the legislative history of the
Unruh Act and concluded that the term “business establishment” was
designed “to include any entity that would have been considered a ‘place
of public accommodation or amusement’ under the pre-1959 version of
section 51.”37 As private social clubs were typically excluded from public
accommodation statutes based on First Amendment freedom of association rights, the court determined that they would similarly be excluded
under the Unruh Act, so long as they “are genuinely selective in their
membership and in which the relationship among members is continuous, personal, and social.”38 That is, an entity does not avoid liability
under the Unruh Act simply by naming itself a private social club. In
Warfield, although the nonprofit country club at issue purported to be
a private social club, the court determined that it was a “business establishment” subject to the Unruh Act because of its “regular business
transactions with nonmembers” that made it the functional equivalent
of a commercial enterprise.39
In Ibister v. Boys’ Club of Santa Cruz, Inc.,40 the California Supreme Court further extended the understanding of what might be considered a business establishment under the Unruh Act. There, girls
sued after the Boys’ Club rejected their membership applications based
on sex.41 The Boys’ Club, “a private charitable organization which operates a community recreational facility,”42 argued that it was not subject
to the Unruh Act. The Club reasoned that, as a non-profit without an
economic function, it should not be viewed as a “business establishment” covered by the Unruh Act.43 The court disagreed, finding that the
Club was primarily a “place of public accommodation or amusement”
under the Unruh Act, as “relations with and among its members are of
a kind which take place more or less in “public view,” and are of a “relatively nongratuitous, continuous, nonpersonal, and nonsocial sort.”44
For the California Supreme Court, membership in the Boys’ Club was

35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

Id.
896 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1995).
Id. at 789.
Id. at 790.
Id. at 793.
Ibister v. Boys’ Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., 707 P.2d 212 (Cal. 1985).
Id.
Id. at 214.
Id. at 218.
Id. at 218.
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“equivalent to admission to a place of public amusement,”45 which
would have been covered by the previous public accommodations statute. A dissenting justice in Ibister cautioned that this reasoning would
threaten “many traditionally sex-segregated institutions, such as fraternities and sororities, private schools, and scouting organizations.”46
The California Supreme Court responded to that dissent in Curran
v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts47 by distinguishing those institutions, which it viewed as truly private, from the case in Ibister. The
Boy Scouts in that case denied a leadership position to a gay man, who
sued under the Unruh Act.48 Unlike the Boys Club, the California Supreme Court found that the Boy Scouts “is an organization whose primary function is the inculcation of a specific set of values in its youth
members, and whose recreational facilities and activities are complementary to the organization’s primary purpose.”49 The Court argued
that this was distinct from Ibister, as membership in the Boy Scouts is
more than “simply a ticket of admission to a recreational facility that is
open to a large segment of the public and has all the attributes of a place
of public amusement.”50
Similarly, the California Supreme Court determined in Doe v. California Lutheran High School Association51 that a private all boys high
school was not a business establishment for purposes of the Unruh Act
as its primary function was not commercial but instead “an expressive
social organization whose primary function was the inculcation of values in its youth members.”52 In both this case and Curran, the court
found that some business activities with nonmembers would not make
the Boy Scouts or the high school business establishments as under
Warfield because the transactions with nonmembers “do not involve the
sale of access to the basic activities or services offered by the organizations.”53 Whereas in Warfield the country club sold to nonmembers access to the services provided members, the Boy Scouts or high school
sales of goods to nonmembers is distinct. That is, while the Boy Scouts
sold goods to nonmembers through its stores, it did not sell “entry to
pack or troop meetings, overnight hikes, the national jamboree, or any
portion of the Boy Scouts’ extended training and educational process.”54
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54

Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts, 952 P.2d 218, 237 (Cal. 1998).
Ibister, 707 P.2d at 226 (Mosk, J. dissenting).
Curran, 952 P.2d at 237.
Id.
Id. at 236.
Id.
Doe v. Cal. Lutheran High Sch. Assn., 170 Cal. App. 4th 828, 838 (2009).
Id. at 838 (citing Curran, 952 P.2d at 238).
Curran, 952 P.2d at 238 (emphasis in original).
Id.
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The California Supreme Court noted that the nonmember transactions
(at sporting events or through the retail stores) would be subject to the
Unruh Act.55
A California Court of Appeals found a local rotary club to be a business establishment subject to the Unruh Act in Rotary Club of Duarte
v. Board of Directors.56 In that case, two women and a local rotary club
charged that the male-only policy of the International Rotary Club violated the Unruh Act after the International Rotary Club revoked the
local club’s charter for its policy of admitting women.57 There, the California Court of Appeals looked to the commercial aspects of the Rotary
Club, the business benefits it offered to members, and the public nature
of the community services done by Rotary members.58 In determining
that the Rotary was not a private organization exempt from the Unruh
Act, the Court of Appeals concluded that “[t]he relationship among Rotarians is not continuous, personal and social.”59 The Supreme Court
affirmed this decision, finding that “rather than carrying on their activities in an atmosphere of privacy, [Rotary Clubs] seek to keep their windows and doors open to the whole world.”60
The defendants in that case further alleged that disallowing its
male-only policy infringed upon their rights to freedom of expressive
association under the Constitution.61 However, that the “the male-onlymembership policy [was] valued by a substantial majority of Rotarians
throughout the world and . . . ha[d] enabled the organization to work
effectively on a worldwide basis” did not persuade the Court of Appeals.62 The United States Supreme Court addressed this question after
the California Supreme Court denied the petition for review.63 The
United States Supreme Court found that the Unruh Act did not violate
the First Amendment rights of the Rotary Club by forcing them to admit
women.64 The Unruh Act did not violate the Rotary Clubs right to expressive association because admitting women to the Clubs would not
“affect in any significant way the existing members’ ability to carry out

55

Id.
Rotary Club of Duarte v. Bd. of Dirs., 178 Cal. App. 3d 1035 (1986), aff’d Bd. of Dirs. of
Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
57
Id.
58
Id. at 1058.
59
Id. at 1059.
60
Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l, 481 U.S. at 547, quoting 1 Rotary Basic Library, Focus on Rotary
60–61 (1981) (internal quotations omitted).
61
Id. at 1060.
62
Rotary Club of Duarte, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 1060.
63
Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l, 481 U.S. at 543.
64
Id.
56

497]

ANTIDISCRIMINATION STATUTES

505

their various purposes.”65 Further, the Court found that even should
the members suffer a small infringement in their rights to expressive
association, it was “justified because it serve[d] the State’s compelling
interest in eliminating discrimination against women.”66
B.

Ladies’ Night Discounts and Men’s Early Claims of Sex Discrimination under the Unruh Act

Whereas in the past women seeking access to establishments that
catered to men brought the majority of sex-discrimination claims under
the Unruh Act, more recently, men have also brought claims under the
Act against businesses or organizations that host women’s only events
or provide discounts for women.67 Once established that the discrimination takes place in a “business establishment,” the act forbids “all unreasonable, arbitrary, or invidious discrimination.”68 California courts
have found this discrimination “where the policy or action emphasizes
irrelevant difference between men and women or perpetuates any irrational stereotypes.”69
In Koire v. Metro Car Wash,70 the plaintiff successfully brought
claims under the Unruh Act against several car washes and nightclubs
that offered discounts to women.71 The defendants in that case tried to
argue that the sex-based discount policies were not “arbitrary” in violation of the Act as they were motivated by “substantial business and social purposes.”72 Further, one defendant nightclub argued that its Ladies’ Night promotions encouraged more women to come to the bar,
“thereby promoting more interaction between the sexes,” which it considered a “socially desirable goal.”73 The California Supreme Court disagreed that this was a sufficient policy interest warranting an exception
to the Act, distinguishing it from “the compelling societal interest in
ensuring adequate housing for the elderly which justifies differential
treatment based on age.”74 Instead, it maintained that a business’s economic interest would not be enough to warrant an exception.75

65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75

Id. at 548.
Id. at 549.
Gale, supra note 6.
Cohn v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc., 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 401 (2008).
Id. at 404 (internal quotations omitted).
40 Cal. 3d 24 (1985).
Id.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 33.
Id.
Id.
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Considering damages, the defendants further raised the argument
that the plaintiff was not injured by the price differences.76 The court
however stated that “by passing the Unruh Act, the Legislature established that arbitrary sex discrimination by businesses is per se injurious.”77 Statutory damages are provided under the Act for each violation
“regardless of the plaintiff’s actual damages.”78 The California Supreme
Court cautioned that “differential pricing based on sex may be generally
detrimental to both men and women, because it reinforces harmful stereotypes.”79 The court was critical of a Washington Supreme Court decision on the same issue.80 The Washington Supreme Court had previously ruled that a Ladies’ Night promotion at a basketball game did not
violate the state’s antidiscrimination law precisely because the male
plaintiff in that case suffered no damages as a result.81 In Koire, the
California Supreme Court favorably cited law review articles that discussed the danger in allowing legal systems to treat men and women
differently.82 The court further chastised the Washington Supreme
Court for “succumb[ing] to sexual stereotyping in upholding the Seattle
Supersonics’ ‘Ladies’ Night,’” a decision in which it found that discounts
for women were reasonable because “women do not manifest the same
interest in basketball that men do.”83 According to the California Supreme Court, this kind of sexual stereotyping “is precisely the type of
practice prohibited by the Unruh Act.”84
The California Supreme Court upheld the understanding that arbitrary discrimination was per se injurious under the Unruh Act in Angelluci v. Supper Club.85 In that case, another situation where a man
was charged higher price for admission than women for entry into a
nightclub, the court further held that plaintiffs did not have to affirma-

76

Koire, 40 Cal. 3d at 33.
Id.
78
Id. (emphasis in original).
79
Id. at 34.
80
Id.
81
Maclean v. First Nw. Indus. of Am., Inc., 635 P.2d 683, 685 (Wash. 1981) (“RCW 49.60.030
authorizes private actions for violations of the chapter, but only for the “actual damages sustained.”).
82
Koire, 40 Cal. 3d at 34–35 (“As long as organized legal systems, at once the most respected
and most feared of social institutions, continue to differentiate sharply, in treatment or in words,
between men and women on the basis of irrelevant and artificially created distinctions, the likelihood of men and women coming to regard one another primarily as fellow human beings and only
secondarily as representatives of another sex will continue to be remote.”).
83
Id. at 35, citing MacLean, 635 P.2d at 684.
84
Id. at 35.
85
158 P.3d 718 (Cal. 2007).
77
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tively seek nondiscriminatory treatment in order to have standing under the Unruh Act.86 In dicta, the court suggested that there may be
constitutional or equitable relief available for a business facing abusive
litigation under the Unruh Act.87 In that case, both the trial and appellate courts expressed concerns about the potential for abusive litigation.
In the case, the defendant complained that the “plaintiffs made repeated
unannounced visits to defendant’s business establishment in order to
increase the statutory damages they could seek for multiple violations
of the Act.”88 However, the court chose to leave it to the legislature to
“determine whether to alter the statutory elements of proof to afford
business establishments’ protection against abusive private legal actions and settlement tactics.”89
A California appeals court similarly raised concerns about the potential for abusive litigation in Cohn v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc.90 The
court expressed a distaste for the repeat-player plaintiffs in the case,
who it viewed as being involved in shake-down lawsuits.91 It upheld a
Mother’s Day special at an Angels baseball game that gave away gift
bags to all women over age eighteen.92 Rather than the kind of “arbitrary discrimination the Unruh Act is meant to protect,” the court found
that the promotion was intended to honor mothers.93 Gender was a secondary consideration, as the goal was to provide gifts to mothers.94
Providing gifts to all women in attendance, rather than attempting to
find out which women at the game were mothers, was an acceptable
method of giving gifts to mothers.95 Unlike in Koire, the promotion here
was less egregious as it did not “emphasize an irrelevant difference, nor
perpetuate an irrational stereotype.”96

86

Id. at 719.
Id. at 729.
88
Id. at 728 (emphasis in original).
89
Id. at 729.
90
86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 401 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008); (“No other fans complained about the giveaway,
and Cohn’s complaint only came after he went to the game to deliberately generate his “injury.”
Cohn’s complaint gathers further suspicion because Cohn, his friends, and his counsel have been
involved in numerous of what have been characterized as “shake down” lawsuits. (E.g., Angelucci
v. Century Supper Club (2007) 41 Cal. 4th 160, 178 [158 P.3d 718 (Cal. 2007)].) They proclaim
themselves equal rights activists, yet repeatedly attempted to glean money from the Angels
through the threat of suit. The Act is a valuable tool for protecting our citizens and remedying true
injuries. We are not convinced the Angels’ tote bag giveaway was in any way unreasonable, arbitrary, or invidious discrimination.”)
91
Id. at 405.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 404–05.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Cohn, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 404.
87
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Recent Lawsuits Targeting Women-Only Events

In California, several lawsuits in recent years have been brought
by male plaintiffs against women’s empowerment organizations alleging violations of the Unruh Act. Because these lawsuits have settled
without judicial opinion, it is unclear how California courts might deal
with these charges. Apart from seeking statutory damages, many of
these settlements require the organizations to change their admission
policies.97
Some of the events describe the need for women-only admission
policies in order to provide safe spaces for women. In 2017, two men
refused entry to her show “Girls Night In” sued comedian Iliza Shlesinger.98 A comedy show at a theater, open to the public, that charges a
fee for entry would clearly fall under the Unruh Act. In this case, the
only limitation was based on gender. In the wake of breaking allegations against Harvey Weinstein and Louis C.K., the event was marketed as:
[A] hybrid stand up show and interactive discussion between
Iliza and the women in the audience aimed at giving women a
place to vent in a supportive, fun and inclusive environment.99
Shlesinger described the event as an opportunity for “women to get together, talk and laugh about the things we go through.”100 The complaint charges against what it refers to as the defendants’ “War on
Men,” comparing the admission policy “as being akin to the Montgomery City Lines bus company in Montgomery, Alabama circa 1955.”101
Although the plaintiff in this case withdrew the complaint without prejudice, the same attorney refiled the case as a putative class action in
2018.102 The named plaintiff in the first case is named in the second,
and the complaint is very similar to the original.103
With regards to the alleged Unruh Act violations, the defendants
requested that the court dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the

97

Iman Hariri-Kia, Ladies Get Paid Was Sued for Gender Discrimination – But It’s Not Giving
up Its Mission, BUSTLE (June 1, 2018), https://www.bustle.com/p/ladies-get-paid-was-sued-for-gender-discrimination-but-its-not-giving-up-its-mission-9229052 [https://perma.cc/5H7H-GCKV].
98
St. George v. Shlesinger, No. B687568 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 22, 2017).
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discrimination was “neither unreasonable nor arbitrary.”104 The defendant argued that any discrimination did not perpetuate stereotypes or
“emphasize irrelevant differences.”105 Instead, the defendants argued
that the admissions policy served to create “a safe space for women to
discuss issues uniquely facing this sector of society.”106 This purpose,
the defendants argued, “would be hindered by the presence of men.”107
The court denied the defendants’ demurrer, finding that it did not have
enough information from the complaint to determine whether the admission policy emphasized irrelevant differences or perpetuated irrational stereotypes.108
Other organizations have focused on women’s networking and
providing opportunities for women to meet and discuss realities they
face in the workplace. These organizations attempt to address barriers
women face, including sexual harassment, in spaces without men. The
women’s empowerment organization Ladies Get Paid was sued for violations of Unruh after it held women-only “Ladies Get Drinks” events
at California bars, which were also sued.109 Ladies Get Paid settled the
lawsuit rather than risk potential bankruptcy.110 As the attorney representing the organization said, “[i]f you are a young company, you are
not going to test the merits. You are going to wind up paying the plaintiff to go away.”111 This is especially true because the Unruh Act provides for fee-shifting for prevailing plaintiffs in civil rights cases, creating a greater risk for defendants unsure about their chances in
litigation.112 As a part of the settlement, it had to change its policy to
allow men to attend their events.113 Similarly, a women’s networking
group that held “Clinics and Cocktails” events to teach women golf was
sold after settling a lawsuit alleging Unruh Act violations.114
In 2018, the San Diego Fire Rescue Foundation cancelled a free,
city-sponsored Girls’ Empowerment Camp meant to teach girls about
firefighting after being threatened with suit for alleged violations of the
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Unruh Act.115 The San Diego Fire Rescue Foundation started the camp
in efforts to address the gender disparity among firefighters in the city,
where women comprise only four percent of the department.116 The city
of San Diego pulled funding for the camp after receiving a complaint
letter from an attorney representing a man who wanted to enroll his
son in the camp.117 Although originally cancelled, the mayor directed
city staff to reschedule the event as planned, changing the event to invite both boys and girls to participate in the Girls Empowerment
Camp.118
Some challengers have gone beyond events that actually exclude
men to raise objections to events designed for or marketed towards
women.119 Los Angeles craft beer company Eagle Rock Brewery was
sued over their Women’s Beer Forum, a monthly event for women who
are interested in beer.120 The event allowed men to attend, but it aimed
to be a “space where the women would outnumber the men while discussing craft beer, a rarity.”121 One man filed a claim with California’s
Department of Fair Employment and Housing after a staff member mistakenly told him the event was for women only when he emailed requesting a ticket.122 The Brewery settled with the man after the Department told the Brewery that it believed the claim had merit.123 Brewery
owner Ting Su regretted having to settle and continues to work to “elicit
some form of change at the legislative level to minimize the exploitation
of the Unruh Act by career plaintiffs.”124
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III. COURTS SHOULD LOOK TO THE PURPOSE OF THE UNRUH ACT IN
DECIDING THESE CASES
When the legislature added sex as a protected category under the
Unruh Act in 1974, people understood the move to be aimed at protecting women.125 The Los Angeles Times ran an article titled “Women’s
Rights Legislation—A Vintage Year,” in which it discussed the “landmark legislation in the field of women’s rights” the California legislature passed during the 1973–74 session.126 Jan Baran, of the California
Commission on the Status of Women, described it as “the most productive and exciting in terms of women’s issues in the history of the
state.”127 As discussed above, the law has expanded since that time.
Still, it is perhaps troubling that groups with the same goals as the Unruh Act are now being targeted by men for lawsuits charging discrimination.
As of September 2019, no sex discrimination case against these
women’s empowerment agencies has been decided by a California court.
Some recent California cases have settled rather than face expensive
litigation, suggesting possibly that the organizations did not feel that
their cases were strong enough to prevail under California law. Yet, it
is unclear exactly how the courts would apply the law to these cases. As
discussed above, the Unruh Act seems pretty clear in its prohibitions
against discrimination, and courts apply it liberally. In many respects,
women’s empowerment agencies appear different from previous instances of discrimination through “Ladies’ Night” promotions that were
motivated purely by business interests. Organizations that seek to provide space for women to address sexual harassment or particular difficulties women face in the workplace seem very different from those promotions. It seems incongruous that courts would find that organizations
focused on gender equality have violated antidiscrimination statutes.
Indeed, this section argues that the purpose of the Unruh Act weighs
against finding violations in these cases.
In Rotary Club of Duarte,128 the appellate court discussed that the
Unruh Act “must be construed in the light of the legislative purpose and
design.”129 The court there maintained that “[i]n enforcing the command
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of a statute both the policy expressed in its terms, and the object implicit in its history and background, should be recognized.”130 California’s Unruh Act was drafted to address inequalities in society and the
harms of discrimination.131 The California legislature has discussed
how the Unruh Act’s protections go beyond the listed categories, as “the
California Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the Unruh Act
in an expansive way.”132 Rather than limit its application to the categories explicitly in the text, the Legislature recognized that the courts
have interpreted it as “cover[ing] all arbitrary and intentional discrimination by business establishments.”133 That said, the legislature has
added protected categories through amendments several times
throughout the Unruh Act’s history.
The California Supreme Court has stated that the Unruh Act is
“clear and unambiguous.”134 In Koire, the California Supreme Court
said that “[t]he express language of the Unruh Act provides a clear and
objective standard by which to determine the legality of the practices at
issue.”135 In that case, the sex-based price differentials clearly violated
the “plain language of the Unruh Act.”136 However, that court left open
that “a compelling social policy” might persuade the court to look beyond the statute’s text.137
As seen above, the plain language of the Unruh Act provides extremely broad protections. On its face, the majority of the sex-segregated events and programs mentioned above that have recently been
charged with violating the Unruh Act seem to do so. The example of the
girls’ empowerment camp might be distinct as it could be compared to
sex-segregated schools or the Boy Scouts, which California courts have
held not to violate the Unruh Act. Similarly, events like the Women’s
Beer Forum that market themselves to women but do not actually exclude anyone also do not violate the text of the Unruh Act. Attempting
to create spaces for women, without excluding anyone based on protected characteristics, should not be made to be in conflict with the
state’s antidiscrimination statute.
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Beyond the text, the California Supreme Court consistently discusses the purpose of the Unruh Act in its decisions, taking into consideration the legislative intent in drafting the statute.138 This interpretation has been used in cases to attempt to define “business
establishment” in line with legislative intent. In determining that the
Mother’s Day giveaway did not violate the Act, one California appellate
court looked to the policy behind the Unruh Act in determining that the
giveaway did not “emphasize an irrelevant difference, nor perpetuate
an irrational stereotype.”139 A willingness to consider the purpose behind the statute might help women’s empowerment organizations convince courts that disallowing men is not “unreasonable, arbitrary, or
invidious discrimination.”140 Organizations aimed at women’s empowerment or helping women get ahead in the work force have the goal of
creating equality between men and women, in keeping with the spirit
of the Unruh Act. Lawsuits bringing these organizations into conflict
with the Unruh Act thus seem in tension with its purpose.
One recent amendment to the Unruh Act, passed in 2005, added
“sexual orientation” and “marital status” to the list of protected categories.141 The legislature started the amendment with the recognition
that, “[e]ven prior to the passage of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, California law afforded broad protection against arbitrary discrimination by
business establishments.”142 The purpose of the Unruh Act was thus “to
provide broader, more effective protection against arbitrary discrimination.”143 Legislators discussed how the addition of these protected characteristics did not “break new ground in expanding the scope of protection provided by the Act.”144 This is because the California Supreme
Court “has rejected the argument that the Unruh Act’s ban on discrimination reaches only the classifications specified in the Act’s text.”145
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The purpose in including these explicitly was to avoid litigation and
“encourage better compliance with the law.”146
It is unclear how a California court would view an argument that
excluding men from women’s empowerment events is not arbitrary discrimination. In the case Easebe Enterprises v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board,147 the defendant tried to argue that excluding men
from a show featuring male dancers was not arbitrary discrimination
as prohibited by the Unruh Act.148 The defendant nightclub argued that:
[C]hanging social perspectives recognize that in some situations
a policy founded on gender-based discrimination is consistent
with everyday realities and in fact inures to the benefit of those
who have been the victims of past societal and legal discrimination.149
The California Court of Appeals ultimately upheld the Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control’s decision to revoke the club’s license for its
discriminatory practice.150 It said that the argument that the practice
of excluding men was “benignly inspired” was not enough to create an
exception to the Unruh Act as a matter of law in this case.151 It stated
that it was not “within the purview of an intermediate appellate court,
at this late date, to substitute its perspective for that of the Department.”152 That said, the court noted that “were we the triers of fact, or
were we writing on an entirely clear slate, we might find such theory
persuasive.”153 However, the court felt restricted by the judgment previously made by the Department. This suggests that, given a clean
slate, a court may be willing to accept a women’s empowerment organization’s claim that its policy of excluding men should be exempt from
the Unruh Act on these grounds. Or, as discussed below, this logic might
be more cleanly adopted through a legislative exemption to the Unruh
Act.
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IV. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT EQUAL PROTECTION AND
PERPETUATING GENDER STEREOTYPES
As discussed above, California courts state one purpose of sex-discrimination bans is a concern that they perpetuate irrational stereotypes. This is taken from Supreme Court Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection understanding of sex discrimination, which has traditionally
focused on eradicating stereotypes. Although these events are held by
private actors, the Supreme Court’s discussion of sex discrimination by
state actors in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment can provide some insight into how courts should
consider these issues. California courts should follow the Supreme
Court in deciding whether discrimination is arbitrary (in violation of
the Unruh Act) based on whether the organizations’ policies are
founded on gender stereotypes.
In United States v. Virginia,154 the Supreme Court held that Virginia Military Institution’s (VMI) categorical exclusion of women denied
them equal protection in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.155
The Supreme Court discussed that, in order to defend gender-based
state action, the state would have to show “at least that the [challenged]
classification serves important governmental objectives and that the
discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives.”156 The Court said that sex classifications by government actors would be allowed in some cases in order to,
for example, “compensate women for particular economic disabilities
[they have] suffered . . . promote equal employment opportunity . . . advance full development of the talent and capacities of our Nation’s people.”157 They would not be allowed, however, “to create or perpetuate
the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.”158 In both this case
and Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,159 the Court highlighted that single-sex policies may not be based on stereotypes.160 That
is, classifications must avoid “fixed notions concerning the roles and
abilities of males and females.”161 The Supreme Court highlighted that
this distinction is important in order to avoid “perpetuat[ing] historical
patterns of discrimination.”162
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As discussed in the debate between the California and the Washington Supreme Courts, California courts similarly forbid single-sex
policies that are based on irrational stereotypes. Unlike older “Ladies’
Night” promotions that California courts have seen as focusing on arbitrary distinctions between men and women and thus advancing irrational stereotypes of women, women’s empowerment organizations do
not seem to evoke the same ideas. Instead, organizations that coach
women to ask for higher salaries or offer space to discuss experiences
with sexual harassment would work to combat stereotypes women face
in their workplaces. Under this understanding, the situations in the
new cases mentioned above would not violate the Unruh Act.
This can be a complicated argument because, as one California Appeals Court discussed, “few cases have held discriminatory treatment
to be nonarbitrary based solely on the special nature of the business
establishment.”163 The examples the court gave were limited: (1) a gambling club’s exclusion of one individual woman who was found to be a
compulsive gambler;164 and (2) a cemetery’s exclusion of “punk rockers”
from a private funeral at the request of the deceased’s family.165 The
court discussed that the exceptions are generally only allowed “when
there is a strong public policy in favor of such treatment.”166 There, the
court cited examples of excluding minors from bars and ensuring affordable housing for the elderly.167
The court left open that there “may also be instances where public
policy warrants differential treatment for men and women,” discussing
sex-segregated facilities like restrooms justified by a right to personal
privacy.168 The court suggested that even some sex-based price differentials may be warranted by a “compelling social policy.”169 Further, it
stated that public policy can occasionally be gleaned from viewing other
statutory enactments.170 A women’s networking organization may be
able to point to statutes like the Equal Pay Act to suggest that public
policy supports efforts to close the gender pay gap. Insofar as these organizations seek to equal the playing field between men and women,
they do not seem to advance irrational stereotypes against women. The
California legislature, spurred by the #MeToo Movement, further
passed several laws that took effect January 1, 2019, to combat sexual
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harassment.171 Jennifer Barrera, executive vice president with the California Chamber of Commerce, recognized this explicitly, stating, “#MeToo was a dominating topic at the Capitol this year.”172 These statutory
enactments give more weight to women’s empowerment organizations’
claims that their goals are supported by a “compelling social policy.”
This distinction would also combat the possibility of historically privileged groups attempting to discriminate against historically marginalized groups, as there will not be the same compelling social policy.
V. LEGISLATIVE ALTERNATIVES: EXCEPTIONS FOR HISTORICALLY
MARGINALIZED GROUPS
As it stands, women-only organizations have a difficult time of
avoiding the Unruh Act in California. Courts can read the law narrowly
to avoid applying the Unruh Act to events that are designed for or marketed towards women, but that do not exclude men. Beyond that, it is
not obvious that a solution like the one the Supreme Court in Washington gave in MacClean, of requiring the plaintiff to prove damages,
would be better. The flexibility of the Unruh Act allowed it to expand to
cover protected characteristics (like gender identity or sexual orientation) that were not considered by the legislators drafting it. Allowing
that discrimination is per se injurious under California law and having
statutory damages encouraged the filing of civil rights lawsuits in order
to benefit the society as a whole. Rather than changing that jurisprudence, which could limit the Unruh Act’s application in other situations,
the legislature could act to carve out an exception for these organizations.
If legislatures want to leave space for these types of events, they
could carve out exceptions in their Civil Rights Laws. One potential way
to distinguish between whether groups are in line with the laws or not
could be to analyze the power dynamics. As an example, under the Canadian Human Rights Code:
It is not a discriminatory practice for a person to adopt or carry
out a special program designed to prevent disadvantages that
are likely to be suffered by, or to eliminate or reduce disadvantages that are suffered by, any group of individuals when
those disadvantages would be based on or related to the prohib-

171

Kathleen Pender, New California Harassment Laws Take Effect Jan. 1, S.F. CHRON. (Dec.
31, 2018), https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/networth/article/New-California-harassment-law
s-take-effect-Jan-1-13499089.php [https://perma.cc/5NZU-EZNE].
172
Id.

518

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2019

ited groups of discrimination by improving opportunities respecting goods, services, facilities, accommodation or employment in relation to that group.173
As an example of a “special program” thus protected, the Canadian Human Rights Commission points out that the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women provides for temporary “special measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality
between men and women.”174 Language like this would still prohibit arbitrary discrimination while allowing historically marginalized groups
to attempt to reduce disparities. An exception like this would likely protect networking and empowerment groups. It would also prevent historically privileged groups from using the Unruh Act to attack women’s
organizations.
VI. CONCLUSION
One California appellate court expressed an aversion to finding violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act in cases of what it was concerned
were men “involved in numerous of what have been characterized as
‘shake down’ lawsuits.”175 This is especially concerning given that the
settlements mentioned above threaten to shut down the organizations
completely. To the extent these laws are used as a tool to harass women
or attempt to get money through the threat of a lawsuit, their application to these types of organizations seems inherently in conflict with the
laws. Especially given recent statutory enactments by the California
legislature focused on helping women gain power in the workplace and
eliminating sexual harassment, these organizations have a strong argument that they do not arbitrarily discriminate in violation of the Unruh Act. In keeping with the U.S. Supreme Court’s Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, the examples given above do not perpetuate
stereotypes by excluding men.
It is not clear the extent to which courts might accept an argument
that organizations seeking to ameliorate gender inequality should be
treated differently under the law than organizations that perpetuate
inequality. This space could be filled by legislative efforts to provide exemptions for these organizations, focusing on power dynamics and historically marginalized groups. Given that the majority of these organizations have chosen to settle their cases rather than face potentially
devastating legal fees, a legislative carveout might be needed.
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As one California court of appeals reasoned, “[t]his important piece
of legislation provides a safeguard against the many real harms that so
often accompany discrimination. For this reason, it is imperative we not
denigrate its power and efficacy by applying it to manufactured injuries. . . .”176 Limiting its application to cases of arbitrary discrimination
that perpetuate stereotypes would serve to better meet the goals of the
Unruh Act itself.
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